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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3527 
___________ 
 
FRANKLYN DEVON PRILLERMAN 
 
      
 
v. 
 
WARDEN CURRAN FROMHOLD; C.O. SAM; COLEMAN C.O.; LYNCH, C.O.; 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; SYLVIA MELTON, CORRECTION OFFICER  
 
                           Franklyn Prillerman, Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01414) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 16, 2017 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 28, 2017) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Franklyn Devon Prillerman appeals the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to the defendants.  We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 In 2010, Prillerman was placed on probation in Arkansas.1  He moved to 
Philadelphia, and in November 2012, was stopped by Philadelphia police while he was 
driving.  When the police ran a warrant search, they determined that he had an 
outstanding warrant for violating the terms of his probation in Arkansas.  Prillerman was 
arrested and brought to the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (CFCF), where he was 
detained while awaiting extradition to Arkansas.  On December 11, 2012, Prillerman 
participated in a two-way video extradition hearing at CFCF.  Before the hearing, 
Corrections Officer Tanya Lynch permitted Prillerman to speak to his lawyer, a public 
defender, over the telephone.  Officer Lynch instructed Prillerman to say only “yes” to 
questions posed by his attorney and prohibited him from asking questions or otherwise 
discussing his case.  Prillerman complied with these instructions.  During the subsequent 
video-conference hearing, Prillerman waived extradition after being questioned on the 
record.  He was then returned to Arkansas, where he was sentenced to effectively ten 
months’ imprisonment for his probation violation. 
                                              
1 In the District Court, the parties stipulated to these facts for purposes of summary 
judgment. 
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 Prillerman then filed the complaint at issue here.  In his operative second amended 
complaint, he asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Lynch 
violated his constitutional rights by preventing him from speaking freely to his attorney.  
He also sought to hold the City of Philadelphia liable, alleging that Officer Lynch had 
acted pursuant to a City policy or custom and that the City had failed adequately to train 
Officer Lynch.2  Ultimately, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, and Prillerman filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  See Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 
812 F.3d 319, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2016).   
In the main, we agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  To the 
extent that Prillerman framed his claim as alleging a violation of his First Amendment 
right to access the courts or his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the District Court 
correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants.3  As to Prillerman’s access-to-
the-courts claim, he failed altogether to make the requisite showing that he suffered an 
actual injury (such as the loss or rejection of a legal claim).  See Monroe v. Beard, 536 
                                              
2 In the District Court, Prillerman also raised an Eighth Amendment claim concerning the 
defendants’ delay in providing him access to a bathroom.  Because he did not present any 
argument concerning that claim in his brief, he has waived any challenge to that aspect of 
the District Court’s judgment, and we will not discuss it further.  See United States v. 
Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 555 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017).  
3 In challenging Officer Lynch’s conduct, Prillerman also cites, in passing, the Fourth and 
Eighth Amendments, but he has not sufficiently developed these arguments to permit our 
review.  See, e.g., John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1997).  
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F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008).  Likewise, there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
at an extradition hearing.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Alameida, 397 F.3d 1175, 1180-81 (9th 
Cir. 2005); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1999). 
However, Prillerman also argued that Officer Lynch’s conduct — i.e., her 
preventing him from communicating fully and freely with his attorney — violated his 
rights under the Due Process Clause.  The District Court did not address this claim.  On 
appeal, the defendants do not dispute that Prillerman raised a due process claim.  Instead, 
the defendants contend that compensatory damages are unavailable to Prillerman.  They 
argue that, while a plaintiff raising a claim like Prillerman’s might potentially be 
permitted to “recover for any injury, such as emotional distress, caused by the deprivation 
of due process itself,” Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1991)), Prillerman cannot do so because 
he did not suffer a physical injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires 
that “a prisoner demonstrate physical injury before he can recover for mental or 
emotional injury.”  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003).  Even if this is 
correct, however (and as the defendants acknowledge), the PLRA does not limit a 
prisoner’s ability to obtain nominal or punitive damages.  See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 533.  
Thus, we are not convinced that Prillerman’s claim necessarily fails due to the 
unavailability of damages.  See, e.g., See Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the matter 
for the District Court to address in the first instance Prillerman’s due process claim 
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against Officer Lynch and the City of Philadelphia.4  In all other respects, we will affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.   
                                              
4 We express no opinion on the merits of this claim.   
